Privacy Office
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Docket number DHS/TSA-2003-1

To the Privacy Office at the Department of Homeland Security:

I am writing to express my opposition to the testing and possible implementation of the "CAPPS II" [Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening] surveillance system. As written, the rules will violate the privacy of everyone who travels via aircraft, and thus must be withdrawn.

The proposed rules will allow for a significant expansion of CAPPS II beyond the original stated purpose of catching terrorists. The proposed rules state that the TSA would like to be able to share with law enforcement information gathered by the CAPPS II system about those who have outstanding arrest warrants for violent crimes. While catching violent criminals is of course important, law enforcement has enough tools to track down these individuals without resorting to surveilling the entire traveling public.

Definitions of "terrorists" and "terrorist organizations" are too vague and could be used to harass people simply because of their political leanings. The definitions used in the Federal Register notice only vaguely describe "terrorists", "links to terrorists", and "terrorist organizations". The question becomes who is a "terrorist" and what constitutes a "terrorist organization"? For example, the Eagle Forum has stated that their members get singled out at airports for extra security. Are members of the Eagle Forum considered extremists or potential terrorists and therefore deserving of extra scrutiny?

The proposed rules would have airlines and travel agencies collect name and address records from Passenger Name Records (PNRs), as well as forcing travel agencies and airlines to add a field for date of birth. Never before has name, address, and date of birth been required to make a flight reservation. Two good reasons for not collecting this data are that it makes identity theft an easier crime to commit with so much personal information available, and that it may result increase in home burglaries. Employees "on the inside" will know for a fact which residences are empty and for which time period they will be empty. We've already seen an increase in theft from unlocked pieces of luggage. This system will be more of the same. Trading the perceived security of a profile for definite insecurity of personal information is a recipe for increased crime.

Recourse for passengers is still almost non-existent. The proposed rules places hurdles in front of access to passenger information that the average person will not climb. Contesting records, and requesting and amendment will almost certainly be an exercise in frustration for most people. An appeals process to the DHS Privacy Office is a laughable suggestion to a serious problem. At the very least there should be someone onsite to help resolve passenger problems.

For these reasons and others, the proposed rules regarding CAPPS II should be withdrawn.

Sincerely,